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European involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict has taken various forms 
over the last hundred years. Certainly the origins of the conflict cannot be 
understood without reference to racism, nationalism and war in Europe. The 
political contours of the whole Middle East region were determined by British and 
French imperial machinations between the 1920s and 1950s. During the Cold 
War the superpowers became more instrumental but when they took opposite 
sides in the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, the Europeans adopted a range of positions 
somewhere in between. 
 
Latterly the European Union (EU) has emerged as a new player in the quest for 
conflict resolution and while its role has been secondary to that of the United 
States, the EU was quicker to articulate the goal of independent statehood for the 
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza. Yet even though the EU, the US, the 
United Nations and Russia joined forces after 2002 in the so-called Quartet and 
endorsed a ‘two-state solution’ to the conflict, the EU has deferred to US 
leadership on how to get there. 
 
Here the story of European involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is 
depicted in five successive phases. The first covers the period of the British 
Mandate in Palestine, Nazi ascendancy in Europe and the Holocaust, concluding 
with the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948 and genesis of the 
Palestinian refugee problem. The second phase sees the demise of European 
imperialism, the Suez debacle, superpower rivalry, the 1967 and 1973 wars, 
wherein Israel captured and occupied the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the oil 
shock, and the US-brokered Egypt-Israel peace treaty of 1979.  
 
In 1980 the European Community (EC) issued the Venice Declaration, signalling 
for the first time a collective European position on the conflict that included 
recognition of the right of Palestinians to self-determination. This marked the 
beginning of the third phase, during which the EC was transformed into the 
European Union (EU). It then adopted a central economic role in what became 
the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP).  
 
The outbreak of the second Palestinian Intifada in 2000 marked the beginning of 
the fourth phase, during which the advent of ‘the war on terror’ and the Iraq crisis 
transformed the international and regional context of the conflict. In the face of 
Israel’s military crackdown on Palestinian resistance and terrorism, the EU 
poured its resources into keeping the Palestinian Authority (PA) afloat. 
Simultaneously, the EU also forged closer ties with Israel under the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).  
 
The fifth and final phase in the story began in 2006, when the Islamist movement 
Hamas won Palestinian legislative elections that were financed and monitored by 
Hollis, R. (2013) ‘Europe and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict’ in Joel Peters & David 
Newman, eds., Routledge Handbook of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict. Pp.336-345. 
 
Author’s pre-publication copy. To cite please refer to the published version. 
 
 2
the Europeans. The EU, along with the rest of the Quartet, then refused to deal 
with Hamas, pending satisfaction on Quartet requirements. After Hamas took 
sole control of the Gaza Strip in 2007, the EU focused on Palestinian institution-
building in the West Bank, while Gaza languished under an Israeli blockade 
endorsed by Washington. Too embedded in bilateral economic relations with 
both Israel and the PA to walk away, EU policy now consists of repeated calls on 
both to agree a solution.  
 
Europe and the Origins of the Conflict 
 
In the late nineteenth century, Europe was the context for the development of the 
Zionist movement (see Chapters 1 and 2). Simply put, were it not for the 
persecution of Jews in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe and Russia in the 
nineteenth century, the impetus for the creation of a national homeland for the 
Jews might have gained less traction. The origins of Zionism are discussed in 
Chapter 2 and need not be repeated here. However, for present purposes it is 
important to mention how the British featured in the realisation of Zionist 
aspirations.  
 
Members of the British establishment were divided in their reactions to the Zionist 
cause, though some saw it as potentially serving British interests in the context of 
the First World War and Britain’s imperial ambitions in the Middle East. In 
November 1917 the British Foreign Secretary Lord Balfour wrote a letter to Lord 
Rothschild saying that the British Government: 
[v]iews with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for 
the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the 
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall 
be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-
Jewish communities in Palestine…1 
 
In the aftermath of war and the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Britain and 
France took the lead in dividing up the Middle East into separate states and 
spheres of influence. Britain acquired the League of Nations Mandate for 
Palestine in 1922 and Balfour’s letter, which became known as the Balfour 
Declaration, was incorporated into the terms of the Mandate.2 At British 
insistence, a further provision was added by which Transjordan was excluded 
from implementation of the Balfour Declaration. 
 
The flow of Jewish migrants to Palestine was to swell significantly during the 
1930s and ‘40s as a consequence of the rise of Nazism in Europe. In the face of 
this and resulting Arab hostility, the British authorities took steps to control the 
numbers of Jewish immigrants, only to incur Zionist hostility and international 
opprobrium (especially in the United States) when they tried to turn away Jewish 
refugees seeking entry to Palestine. 
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This friction notwithstanding, some of the measures the British authorities took to 
counter violent Arab opposition to their rule and to Jewish immigration, bolstered 
the position of the Zionists vis à vis the Palestinians. The British also deployed 
emergency powers to suppress unrest that were later adopted by Israel after the 
establishment of the Jewish state. From a Palestinian perspective, therefore, the 
British were deemed responsible both for enabling the Zionist enterprise to take 
off and for undermining the relative strength of the Palestinians in the ensuing 
contest. 
 
Victorious but exhausted and overstretched at the end of the Second World War, 
the British were obliged to regroup. Britain’s gradual withdrawal from its imperial 
domains began with Indian independence in 1947. The same year, the British 
referred the question of Palestine to the United Nations. However, when the UN 
voted in favour of partition, between a Jewish state and an Arab state, the 
Zionists acquiesced but the Arabs declared their opposition and the British, 
lacking the capacity and the will to enforce partition, packed up and left, leaving 
the parties to their fate in the war of 1948. 
 
As a result Jordan, with British support, won control of the West Bank, including 
East Jerusalem, along with many of the 700,000 or so Palestinian refugees 
displaced in the fighting. Other refugees fled north to Syria and Lebanon. Many 
also ended up in the Gaza Strip, which came under Egyptian administration from 
1948 until 1967. 
 
Europe and the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict during the Cold War 
 
Israel’s victory was the Palestinians’ nakba or catastrophe and antipathy to the 
Jewish state became a central feature of the Arab nationalist cause, along with 
anti-European imperialism in the 1950s and ‘60s. The British and French 
progressively retreated in the face of independence movements across the 
globe, including in the Middle East.  
 
Following the overthrow of the British-backed monarchy in Egypt, Gamal Abdel 
Nasser emerged as the President of the Republic and champion of Arab 
Nationalism. Opposed to Nasser’s regional influence and fearing a curtailment of 
their access to the Suez Canal – a vital artery for European shipping between the 
Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean – in 1956 the British and French secretly 
colluded with the Israelis to seize the Canal and topple Nasser.3 
 
Their mission was thwarted by the Americans, who forced a withdrawal of the 
British, French and Israeli armed forces and in the process won favour across the 
Arab world for countering the Israelis and the old imperialists. The Suez War 
marked the nadir of British imperial fortunes in the Middle East, after which the 
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monarchy they had installed in Iraq was ousted in 1958 and their influence in 
Jordan was curtailed. By 1967 they were forced out of Yemen by rebels 
supported by Nasser. The French retreated also and gave up their campaign to 
hold onto Algeria in 1962.  
 
By 1967 both France and Britain had ceased to exercise decisive influence in the 
region. Until that date, France did serve as the principal supplier of arms to 
Israel, but as of the 1967 war, the French changed policy and opted for closer 
relations with the Arabs. Britain left its last outposts of empire in the Gulf in 1971 
and became a competitor with the French, the Americans and others for lucrative 
commercial contracts in the Arab oil-producing states and Iran during the first oil 
boom. Most Europeans, with the notable exception of the Netherlands, 
accommodated to Arab pressure during the oil embargo that accompanied the 
1973 war. 
 
Meanwhile, Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union 
became the overriding determinant of external engagement in the Middle East, 
as recounted elsewhere in this volume. In the 1967 war the superpowers were 
ranged on opposite sides. In the aftermath, however, the British and French, both 
Permanent Members of the UN Security Council, were instrumental in the 
drafting and adoption of UNSC Resolution 242. 
 
This milestone bears mention here because Resolution 242 subsequently 
became the benchmark for official European pronouncements on the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. In essence, Resolution 242 and the successor Resolution 338, adopted 
in the October 1973 Arab-Israeli War, called for the exchange of land for peace. 
The Europeans have repeatedly referred back to this formula as the key to 
resolving the conflict. They contend that the most sustainable road to peace 
between Israel and the Arabs depends upon Israel giving up the land it captured 
in 1967, including the West Bank and Gaza Strip, in return for recognition and 
acceptance by its neighbours.  
 
By contrast, the Americans have tended to assume that if the parties to the 
conflict can arrive at an agreement, so be it, irrespective of whether that 
agreement is fully in accordance with UN pronouncements. Judging by recent EU 
statements however (see below), the Europeans have come to the view that, 
provided both sides agree, there can be adjustments to the 1967 borders. 
 
From the Venice Declaration to the Demise of the Oslo Process (1980-2000) 
 
The EC’s Venice Declaration of 1980 constituted the first major joint statement of 
the Europeans on the Arab-Israeli conflict and the beginning of Europe’s 
emergence as a new player in the region. It broke new ground by recognizing the 
right of Palestinians to self-determination and calling for the inclusion of the 
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Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) in peace negotiations. However, Israel 
rejected the declaration out of hand and the Americans pursued their own 
initiatives. As of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982 that country became the 
main focus of such efforts. The emergence of Hizballah, with Iranian support, 
hostage-taking and the attacks on US and French marines in Beirut widened the 
conflict and engendered animosities that still endure. 
 
Escorted out of Lebanon under US and French mediation, the PLO leadership 
decamped to Tunis. Notwithstanding some unofficial European contacts with the 
Organisation, it continued to be barred as a terrorist group by the Israelis. Even 
the PLO was then taken by surprise when the first Palestinian Intifada or uprising 
broke out spontaneously in Gaza in December 1987 and spread rapidly to the 
West Bank. Television coverage of armoured Israeli forces confronting stone-
throwing youths and civilian demonstrators on the streets of Palestinian towns 
drew international sympathy for the Palestinians and triggered a shift in 
European thinking about the conflict. Israel came in for much criticism, but the 
emergence of a strong peace camp in Israel also opened up possibilities for new 
‘people-to-people’ initiatives involving both sides, many of which the Europeans 
helped to fund and facilitate. 
 
Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in 1990 diverted attention to the Gulf. In the ensuing 
crisis the Arabs divided, with the PLO taking the Iraqi side. The Europeans 
contributed troops, armour and funds to the US-led coalition force that defeated 
the Iraqis in early 1991. Yet, when the United States (and Russia) convened the 
ground-breaking Middle East peace conference at Madrid in November 1991, the 
EC was granted only observer status. Europe was not yet considered a serious 
player. The European case for involvement was not helped by internal 
disagreement over who should represent European member states on such 
occasions and to this day the EU suffers from the difficulties of establishing a 
unified position on foreign policy issues. 
 
However, in the multi-lateral talks initiated by the Madrid conference, the EU was 
made ‘gavel-holder’ of the Regional Economic and Development Working Group 
(REDWG).4 The Europeans also participated in parallel talks on regional security, 
refugees and environment, but they used REDWG to carve out a role for the EU 
in the MEPP that became increasingly instrumental in the fortunes of the 
Palestinians. The purpose of the multilateral talks was to bolster the prospects of 
the bilateral negotiations between Israel and the Arabs, hosted by Washington. 
 
However, it was a Norwegian initiative that produced what became the Oslo 
Accords between Israel and the PLO, soon to be adopted and managed by the 
United States. The details of the ensuing ‘Oslo Process’ are discussed in Section 
2 of this volume. Here, suffice to say, the Europeans embraced that process as a 
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recipe for resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and expected that it would 
likely lead to Palestinian statehood, alongside Israel, in the West Bank and Gaza.   
 
Meanwhile, in 1995 the EU initiated the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 
programme (EMP), the central goal of which was to turn the Mediterranean basin 
into a free trade area encompassing Israel as well as the Arab littoral states and 
Jordan. Security cooperation was also envisaged, as well as cultural exchanges 
and environmental protection. Crucially, through promoting human rights and 
political reform in the Arab partner countries the EU hoped to use the EMP to 
transform these states and thereby address its own security concerns about 
migration and terrorist violence perpetrated by Islamist groups linking militants in 
Europe and North Africa. 
 
A central assumption of the EMP was that the MEPP would deliver. All the 
protagonists, including Syria and Lebanon, as well as the Palestinians and 
Jordan, attended EMP meetings alongside the Israelis, notwithstanding setbacks 
and reversals in bilateral peace negotiations during the 1990s. This experience 
encouraged the EU to believe that the EMP could make progress in parallel with 
but not dependent upon the fortunes of the MEPP. However, the vision of the 
EMP could not ultimately be realised without resolution of the conflict. 
Meanwhile, the institutional frameworks through which the EU pursued its 
objectives in both arenas overlapped and became fused.5  
 
Once the PA was established the EU and its member states began channelling 
funds previously dispersed to Palestinian NGOs directly to the PA, along with 
development aid, though EU support for ‘people-to-people’ projects also 
continued. In addition, European governments identified various infrastructure 
projects, such as a port facility in the Gaza Strip and an airport, for state and EU 
funding.  
 
On the diplomatic front, the Americans took the lead and expected the 
Europeans to be supportive but in the background. For the most part the 
Europeans went along, but when progress on implementation of the Oslo 
Accords faltered, particularly during the tenure of the Likud government in Israel 
from 1996 to 1999, the Europeans were frustrated and critical, and they showed 
it by delaying ratification of successive trade and cooperation agreements with 
Israel. However, under the EMP, the EU did eventually sign and ratify 
Partnership Agreements with both Israel and the PA.  
 
The results were mixed. The agreement with the PA took it for granted that 
economic protocols between Israel and the Palestinians, which assumed 
complex interdependence and a customs union between the two, would proceed 
to plan. In reality, the Palestinian economy was subordinate and constrained by 
the effects of Israeli security measures. The EU Partnership Agreement with 
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Israel, meanwhile, drew a distinction between goods made in Israel and those 
made in settlements in the Occupied Territories, such that only the former could 
enter the EU without paying customs dues. However, in practice observance of 
this distinction was cumbersome and fudged, and it became a source of 
contention between the Israelis and Europe. 
 
With respect to US handling of the peace negotiations, European 
pronouncements indicated a level of scepticism about Washington’s capacity to 
understand Palestinian concerns as readily as those of Israel. Yet they 
recognized the limits of their own leverage with the Israelis in comparison to that 
of the United States and therefore looked to Washington to deliver Israel. On 
occasion the French suggested a new peace conference might be required to 
trigger progress, but could not force the issue without US concurrence. British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair made a number of efforts to actually assist US 
diplomacy.6 Yet the Israelis and even the Palestinians remained more attentive to 
Washington than any European mediation.  
 
Eventually, following the unsuccessful US summit at Camp David in July 2000, 
the Oslo Process collapsed. The second Palestinian Intifada unleashed a series 
of Palestinian suicide attacks on Israeli civilians that destroyed the Israeli peace 
camp and led to the election of Ariel Sharon. He initiated a crackdown on the 
Palestinians intended to crush Palestinian resistance and ‘lower their 
expectations’. 
 
Vain quest to re-start the MEPP (2001-2005) 
 
In 2001 George W Bush became the new US President and initially showed little 
interest in resolving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the absence of US 
engagement the Europeans could do little more than provide the funds to keep 
the PA from total collapse while the conflict raged. The EU contended that 
preservation of the PA was essential to counter the Israeli claim that there was 
no Palestinian partner to negotiate with. Even so, the suicide attacks on Israeli 
civilians eroded public sympathy for the Palestinians in Europe. Accusations of 
corruption in the PA prompted the EU to demand stringent reforms in PA 
accounting practices. Meanwhile, the EU was itself evolving and preoccupied 
with the absorption of new members and the quest for a European constitution. 
 
Against this backdrop the attacks on the United States of 11 September 2001 
(9/11) transformed the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the hopes for 
peace. The Bush administration declared ‘war on terror’ and the Israelis defined 
their confrontation with the Palestinians in this context. Arafat, previously a 
frequent guest at the Clinton White House, was no longer welcome in 
Washington and remained holed up in his headquarters in Ramallah. After the 
Americans cut funding to the PA, it fell to the EU to pay the salaries of PA 
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employees as a way to avert a humanitarian crisis in the Occupied Territories. 
EC officials contemplated cutting support to oblige the Israelis to shoulder 
responsibility in accordance with the Geneva Conventions – but they baulked for 
fear that the strategy would backfire.   
 
Meanwhile, attention in Europe and the Middle East became riveted on US plans 
for Iraq. The Iraq crisis and invasion of 2003 caused a major split in the Atlantic 
alliance and within the EU. The British stood beside the Americans, but largely 
failed to use their access in Washington to convince them of the importance of 
reviving the MEPP. The new East European members of the EU were also 
supportive of Washington, but Germany opposed the invasion as too did the 
French, who joined various Arab leaders in predicting mayhem across the Middle 
East as a result of it.  
 
Against this backdrop, EU engagement on the Israeli-Palestinian issue followed 
two parallel tracks. Funding of the PA was continued, while diplomacy was 
focused on Washington – where EU leverage was compromised by the Iraq 
crisis. Following Bush’s pronouncement in 2002 that Palestinian statehood 
alongside Israel was his vision for peace, the EU worked within the Quartet to 
devise a road map for reaching that goal. The plan was finally launched in the 
wake of the Iraq invasion, but languished thereafter, in part because of US and 
Israeli manoeuvres to keep Arafat out of the frame. After his death in November 
2004 the Israelis began a series of unilateral moves that changed the shape of 
the conflict. In summer 2005 they withdrew all the Jewish settlers from the Gaza 
Strip, but continued to control the borders and curtail the movement of 
Palestinians and trade. Work began on the security barrier around and within the 
West Bank, separating major settlement blocks from Palestinian population 
centres. 
 
The EU expressed concerns about the route taken by the barrier, which was 
pronounced contrary to international law by the International Court in the Hague. 
EU statements and approaches to the Israelis included frequent complaints 
about the effects of Israeli security measures on Palestinian economic life and 
welfare in both the West Bank and Gaza. When Palestinian elections were called 
for January 2006, the EU hoped to make this a turning point for the MEPP. It 
was, but not as anticipated. The Hamas victory triggered a crisis from which EU 
diplomacy has not recovered.  
 
The EU decision to put Hamas on its list of terrorist organisations, thereby 
barring it from receipt of EU funds, was taken in 2004, at the height of the ‘war on 
terror’. Having divided over the issue of Iraq the Europeans were at pains to 
demonstrate solidarity with Washington on the terrorism issue at least. In 
addition, Europe was itself the target of terrorist plots, many of which appeared to 
be ‘home-grown’ and European governments began to fear a new phenomenon 
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within, which has been dubbed ‘radicalisation’. A counter-phenomenon, labelled 
Islamophobia, also worried the authorities, as well as incidences of anti-Semitic 
attacks on Jews and Jewish sites. Government responses included measures to 
control immigration and taking a tougher line on asylum seekers. 
 
In theory, the EU remained committed to its political reform agenda in the Middle 
East, enshrined in the EMP. When the Bush administration announced its 
democratisation strategy for Iraq and the ‘Wider Middle East’, the EU countered 
with its Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). In the Mediterranean, this was supposed to 
supplement the broad brush approach of the EMP with a differentiated approach 
to partner countries, tailored to suit the different economic conditions in each. 
Action Plans were agreed with Europe’s southern neighbours that were 
supposed to bring them into closer harmony with EU internal market standards. 
In the process Israel, with the most advanced economy among the partner 
countries, attained a new level of integration with the EU. An opportunity to 
condition closer EU-Israeli relations on progress in conflict resolution was 
sidestepped. 
 
With Europe’s Arab neighbours, meanwhile, closer security cooperation took 
precedence over democratisation and human rights promotion. Only the 
Palestinians were held to strict standards of financial accountability and 
transparency. However, once Hamas won the elections in 2006, the EU faced a 
dilemma. The EU had called for, financed and monitored the elections. Yet not 
only would financing a Hamas-run PA be illegal under EU law, but according to 
the Americans and Israelis, pressure on Hamas would eventually force the 
movement to change fundamentally or relinquish power. The EU opted to join the 
rest of the Quartet in devising three principles that Hamas was enjoined to 
embrace in order to gain acceptance. These were: recognition of Israel’s right to 
exist; renunciation of violence; and acceptance of all previous agreements 
reached between Israel and the PLO and PA. 
 
EU Opts for Risk Avoidance 
 
Devising a unified position across the EU and agreement within the Quartet have 
become the objectives of EU policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict, to the neglect of 
action to resolve it. Whereas in the past individual governments and leaders in 
Europe saw fit to speak out or propose new initiatives, latterly they appear to 
have calculated that risk avoidance is the best policy. Seemingly they have little 
hope that the EU can make a difference, even if it could agree on a more 
interventionist policy. 
 
Yet by going along with the status quo, while issuing dire warnings about the 
situation being unsustainable, the EU has become more deeply embedded in the 
structure of the conflict. By its avoidance of dealing with Hamas and grumbling 
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compliance with the Israeli blockade of Gaza, it has intervened directly in 
Palestinian factional politics. When Hamas ousted its Fatah rivals and took 
control of Gaza in 2007, the EU quickly embraced the emergency administration 
formed in the West Bank under President Mahmoud Abbas, and steered by 
Salam Fayyad as Prime Minister. Since then EU and US funds have been 
channelled into Fayyad’s state-building project and paid Fatah supporters in 
Gaza to stay at home rather than work for Hamas-run organisations. Only the UN 
Relief and Works Agency (UNWRA) has been able to continue an international 
presence in Gaza, but under the blockade, even UNRWA cannot import the 
materials it needs to run its operations. 
 
In a calculated response to Hamas intransigence and rocket attacks into Israel 
from the Gaza Strip, in December 2008 the Israelis launched an offensive that 
resulted in the deaths of some 1,300 Palestinians, including many children, and 
thirteen Israelis. Public opinion polls in Europe revealed a surge of sympathy for 
the Palestinians and the EU, under the Czech presidency, postponed plans for 
upgrading existing agreements with Israel. The realisation that anger at the 
Israelis over the plight of the Palestinians could contribute to the radicalisation of 
Muslim opinion and thence threaten European internal security was 
acknowledged in official circles. 
 
However, the EU looked to the new Obama administration to give the lead on 
what to do next. When President Barack Obama obliged with an urgent call for 
action to resolve the conflict once and for all, on the basis of a two-state solution, 
the relief in Europe was palpable and optimism returned for the first time in years. 
Obama appointed George Mitchell to head up his new initiative; called on the 
Israelis to halt all ‘settlement activity’ in the West Bank; favoured Abbas and his 
administration with renewed support; shunned Hamas; and appealed to the Arab 
states to help persuade the Israelis to resume negotiations with the Palestinians.  
 
However, Binyamin Netanyahu, who became Israeli Prime Minister in 2009, 
declined to institute a total freeze on settlement building. Abbas consequently 
refused to enter into negotiations with him and the Arab states sat on the fence – 
apart from urging the Palestinian factions to overcome their differences. The EU 
had been told by Washington to expect a breakthrough in the MEPP by 
September 2009. It did not materialize and the Obama administration conceded 
that they had underestimated the difficulties and constraints on both sides.  
 
By the end of 2009 the EU was set to introduce the new leadership structure 
outlined in the Lisbon Treaty, inclusive of an EU President and Foreign Minister. 
Pending this development, however, Sweden, which was the last to hold the 
rotating EU presidency before the change, managed to broker a new European 
policy statement on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which broke new ground. It 
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became the basis of the policy stance of the new EU Foreign Minister Cathy 
Ashton. 
 
The ‘Conclusions of the Council of Ministers on the MEPP’ released on 8 
December 20097 was the clearest yet statement of EU thinking on the 
requirements for a comprehensive peace deal. The core element was a renewed 
call for ‘a two-state solution’ to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with ‘the State of 
Israel and an independent, democratic, contiguous and viable State of Palestine, 
living side by side in peace and security’. The Council further stated that the EU 
‘will not recognise any changes to the pre-1967 borders including with regard to 
Jerusalem, other than those agreed by the parties’ and that, in the interests of 
‘genuine peace, a way must be found through negotiations to resolve the status 
of Jerusalem as the future capital of two states’. More broadly, the Council noted 
that: ‘A comprehensive peace must include a settlement between Israel and 
Syria and Lebanon.’ 
 
The Council document represented the culmination of successive European 
statements over several decades, commencing with the 1980 Venice 
Declaration. Seventeen years on, in March 2010 a Joint Statement by the 
Quartet incorporated much of the essence of the EU Council’s December 2009 
Conclusions.8 Thus the Europeans have effectively blazed a trail for all the major 
international stakeholders in the MEPP. Yet while leading on declaratory policy, 
the EU has consistently deferred to the United States when it comes to policy 
implementation. 
 
No Exit Strategy 
 
Since the mid-1990s European engagement in pursuit of a negotiated solution to 
the conflict has grown to an extent that the EU could not now walk away without 
significant costs to the fate of the Palestinians and European relations with Israel. 
European involvement combines: a strong EU declaratory position; membership 
of the Quartet; leading donor support to the PA; co-financing UNRWA; training 
and equipping the Palestinian Police in the West Bank (EUPOL COPPS); and 
providing a monitoring mission for the Gaza-Egypt border crossing (inactive). 
 
EU partnership agreements with Israel, the PA, Jordan and Egypt have endured, 
in the case of Egypt even through the fall of Mubarak in the so-called Arab Spring 
of 2011. Yet Syria’s descent into civil war in 2012 and the threat of war between 
Israel and Iran have subsequently put the quest for resolution of the Arab-Israeli 
conflict on hold. 
 
European investment in containing the conflict and funding the basic needs of the 
Palestinians is vital to the continuance of the status quo. If Europe withdrew its 
personnel and economic support there would be a humanitarian crisis, increased 
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instability, lawlessness, disillusionment and generalised conflict. Yet without 
agreement between the opposing sides, there can be no resolution. The 
Europeans are no more capable of imposing a two-state solution now than the 
British were of enforcing partition in Mandate Palestine.  
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